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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMPULSORY STATIS-
TICAL REPORTS OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION
LEIGHTON P. STRADLEY
How far can the Federal Trade Commission, a purely ad-
ministrative body, compel a private corporation to render reports
and submit statistics dealing with matters which are usually con-
sidered trade secrets or matters of purely private concern? This
is a question of deep significance today, especially in view of its
relation to the broader general subject of government by admin-
istrative bodies, a subject which seems bound to become more
prominent in consequence of the increasing tendency of Con-
gress to delegate its powers to commissions of various kinds.
Professor William Z. Ripley, of Harvard, in his article'
which states the case for the right of shareholders to receive
more adequate information concerning the financial affairs of
their corporation, advocates and defends the exercising of almost
unlimited power by the Commission in this respect. But the
attitude of the federal courts toward this question, although by
no means settled, has reflected a tendency to interpret somewhat
restrictively the powers of the Commission under the Federal
Trade Commission Act.2  The Supreme Court in the Claire
Furnace Company case,3 the most recent involving the point, un-
fortunately avoided the real question, leaving the issue still un-
determined.
Dr. Ripley points out that it appears to be the general prac-
tice of 'corporations to issue balance sheets and income state-
ments that are not fully informative to their stockholders or to
the investing public. He suggests as a corrective and controlling
remedy that the Federal Trade Commission exercise the authority
'The Shareholder's Right to Adequate Information, ATLANnic MONTHLY
(September, 1926) 380. A phase of the same subject was dealt with in (1927)
75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 35o, Note.
'38 STAT. 717 (1914), U. S. COMP. STAT. (I918) § 8836a et seq.
'F. T. C. et al v. Claire Furnace Co. et al., 47 Sup. Ct. 553 (927). See
also the decision in the lower court, infra note i5.
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given it under Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which empowers it (a) to gather and compile information con-
cerning the organization, business and management of corpora-
tions engaged in commerce, and (b) to require such corpora-
tions to file with the Commission certain specific reports in writ-
ing and under oath. He states that such action by the Com-
mission would not require further legislation, and could be
established as an administrative policy if the President of the
United States should take the initiative.
It would seem that this eminent economic authority, although
graphically setting forth known practices of withholding corpo-
rate information, has suggested a remedy that is not fully-avail-
able, according to decisions under the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, to which he refers. The Act, Section 6, reads in part
as follows:
"That the Commission shall have power
"a. To gather and compile information concerning and
to investigate from time to time the organization, business
conduct,* practices, and management of any corporation en-
gaged in commerce, excepting banks and common carriers
subject to the Act to regulate commerce, and its relations
to other corporations and to individuals, associations, and
partnerships."
"b. To require, by general or special orders, corporations
engaged in commerce, excepting banks, and common car-
riers subject to the Act to regulate commerce, or any class
of them, or any of them respectively, to file with the Com-
mission in such form as the Commission may prescribe an-
nual or special, or both annual and special, reports or
answers in writing to specific questions, furnishing to the
Commission such information as it may require as to the
organization, business conduct, practices, management and
relation to other corporations, partnerships and individuals
of the respective corporations filing such reports or answers
in writing. Such reports and answers shall be made under
oath, or otherwise, as the Commission may prescribe, and
shall be filed with the Commission within such reasonable
time as the Commission may prescribe, unless additional
time be granted in any case by the Commission."
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"d. Upon the direction of the President or either
House of Congress to investigate and report the facts re-
lating to any alleged violations of the anti-trust acts by any
corporation."
Decisions which interpret Section 6 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act indicate that the powers granted may be used
only where (i) inter-state commerce is involved, or (2) where
Congress exercises visitorial powers over corporations as a
legislative function, giving the Commission the right to examine
into corporate affairs through some agency or instrumentality.
Recognizing this, Dr. Ripley emphasizes, in his article, in sup-
port of his suggestion, the plenary authority of the United
States. It may, however, be properly assumed, in view of the
present law and its decisions, that the "plenary authority" is
based solely on such federal jurisdiction as may follow the com-
merce clause or the exercise of visitorial powers.
It will be noted, on examination of the cases hereinafter
cited, that while, in almost every case, interstate commerce is
involved, the courts have taken the position that reports and
other information cannot be required indiscriminately of corpo-
rations by the Federal Trade Commission because the reports
must, of necessity, involve not only interstate, but intrastate
commerce as well. As to intrastate affairs, Congress has no'
authority to impose such conditions. It may be safely predicted
that the Federal Trade Commission cannot exercise the sweep-
ing powers as to reports which Dr. Ripley proposes under the
commerce clause, as his report plan is not based on regulation
of commerce. in the true meaning of that term, but more strictly
is a financial, or investment measure over which Congress has no
jurisdiction under the Constitution, the sole source of Con-
gressional authority.
It is also apparent, from the examination of the cases, that
Congress cannot, in this manner exercise visitorial powers over
private corporations. Admittedly this may be a proper legisla-
tive function, especially under state laws. It has been held, how-
ever, as a matter of federal jurisdiction, that the power can be
exercised only by the federal judiciary or by direct committees
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of Congress, and even in such cases, the visitorial powers of
Congress are limited to subject matters over which Congress
has control and which, under the Constitution, it has power to
regulate.- Inasmuch as the Commission is quasi-judicial only
and is not a Congressional committee, the authority to exercise
this power in cases where no violation of the law is alleged, rests
in the courts or in such committees, and delegation of such power
by the legislative branch of the Government to a mere adminis-
trative body such as the Federal Trade Commission is of most
doubtful legality.
Moreover, there is ample authority that-even though the
commerce clause or the visitorial power might be properly in-
voked, an effort by the Federal Trade Commission to delve into
the affairs of private corporations, whether under report re-
quirements or by sending agents to examine books, records and
papers for publicity purposes, is unconstitutional as an unrea-
sonable search and seizure. Corporations may claim protection
against this under the Constitution of the United States.
Dr. Ripley acknowledges that decisions of Federal Courts
have held that the Commission has no authority to enforce Sec-
tion 6 of the Act in cases of this kind. He refers to an argu-
ment then before the United States Supreme Court (evidently
the Claire Furnace case mentioned above) 4 and thinks chances
of affirmation to require federal reports are good, in view of
trust and railroad litigation before that Court heretofore having
resulted in favor of the plenary authority of the United States.
The first case before the courts was that of the United States
v. Basic Products Co." In this case Section 6 was invoked by the
Federal Trade Commission, through the Attorney-General of the
United States. This official filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
to compel the Basic Products Company to submit its books for
inspection so that the cost of its product could be determined to
settle a controversy which that Company had with the Navy De-
partment over a war contract. The mandamus was denied the
Commission. The Court held (after concluding that interstate
'Ibid.
'26o Fed. 472 (W. D. Pa. igIg).
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commerce was not directly involved) that the argument of coun-
sel for defendant was sound in contending that Section 6 was un-
constitutional "insofar as it authorizes investigations and com-
pulsory disclosures of matters which are beyond the commerce
power of Congress" and also "insofar as it attempts to authorize
a search or seizure by an administrative agency of the Govern-
ment without charge or suspicion of wrongdoing."
In Maynard Coal Company v. Federal Trade Commission,
argued in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the
coal company applied for an injunction to restrain the Commis-
sion from taking steps to collect a penalty for failure to make
reports called for by the Commission. The Commission de-
manded information as to.monthly costs of production and other
data from a large number of coal mining companies for each
month of the year 192o, and until further notice. The Com-
mission based its authority on Section 6 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, alleging that Congress had full authority in
the premises under the commerce clause of the Constitution. In
that case, it was admitted that the Coal Company was not charged
with unfair methods of competition, nor was it charged with
any violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act or the anti-
trust acts, the Shernuan Act 7 of 189o and its supplement, the
Clayton Act 8 of 1914.
After reveiwing the facts and authorities, showing that in-
trastate as well as interstate commerce was involved, the Court
said: 9
"In order for the Federal Trade Commission to have
the power to require the plaintiff to make reports as to the
mining of coal and as to its intrastate shipments, it must
appear that this information is necessary to or connected
with some subject over which the general government has
power. There is no claim made that there is any proceed-
ing pending, involving the Anti-trust Act, or unfair methods
of competition, or under the Clayton Act, but in its order
648 Wash. L. Reporter 278 (April 30, i92o).
T26 STAT. 209 (18go), U. S. Comp. STAT. (x918) § 8820 et seq.
838 STAT. 730 (914), U. S. CoMP. STAT. (i918) § 8835a et seq.
'Supra note 6 at 280.
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defendant demands reports in all the business of the plain-
tiff.
"The defendant relies upon the visitorial powers of
Congress over corporations. In this connection, it must
be borne in mind that the power of Congress over an in-
instrumentality of commerce, such as a common carrier, is
far different from its powers over an ordinary business cor-
poration.
"Apart from the fact that plaintiff is a corporation,
it is clear the Congress could not compel the production of the
private books and papers of a citizen, except in the progress
of judicial proceedings.
"But the Commission has undertaken to construe the
Act otherwise and to take steps under its construction to
the Act to require information and reports not relating to
interstate commerce, but relating chiefly or wholly to pro-
duction, and under its order the information which it has
the power to demand cannot be separated from .that over
which it has no control."
In other decisions recently handed down, and especially
in the Baltimore Grain Company case 10 and the Tobacco Com-
panies cases," -1 where arguments in favor of compulsory reports
were urged, lower courts decided adversely. The Commission
sought a mandamus to permit agents of the Commission to ex-
amine books, records, documents, etc., of these companies. The
Commission acted on its own motion, under Section 6, and also
pursuant to a Senate resolution, directing the Commission to
investigate the margins between farm and export prices
the profits or losses of the principal exporting firms and other
data. The Court said:
"The precise question here to be decided is whether
the statute confers upon the Commission the right to inspect
and copy the papers of any private corporation engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce, whenever, in the judgment
of the Commission, such inspection may furnish informa-
Three cases were decided in one opinion and are reported in Federal Trade
Commission v. The Baltimore Grain Company; H. C. Jones Co., Inc., and Ham-
mond Snyder Co., Inc., 284 Fed. 886 (D. C. Md. 1922); aff'd 267 U. S.'586
(1924).
' Infra note 13.
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tion of value to an inquiry it is making as to some economic
or commercial problem, and when it has no reason to be-
lieve that any violation of law has been committed."
The Court held that the threatened search and seizure by the
agents of the Commission was unreasonable and prevented it by
denying the petition for the mandamus. On appeal to the Su-
preme Court of the United. States, this decision was affirmed in
a' per curiam opinion.12
Other recent and conclusive cases on the subject are Federal
Trade Commission v. P. Lorillard Company and American To-
bacco Co., 13 two cases decided in one written opinion, by the
United States District Cofirt for the Southern District of New
York. The Commission in pursuance of a Senate resolution,
demanded an examination of the books, records and papers. of
these companies. The Court held that while the President or
either House of Congress can call upon the Federal Trade Com-
mission, under Section 6, to make investigations, it nevertheless
can do so only by alleged violations of the anti-trust acts. The
Court in construing Section 6, inter alia, said :14
"Reading Secs. 5, 6, and 9, I do not think that Congress
intended, at the time of the enactment of this law, to go
beyond the well-recognized principles of limitations with
reference to searches and seizures guarded against by the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. It is better to de-
duce the intention that information should only be extracted
by the procedure long established in the courts in conform-
ity with the Constitutional guarantee against unlawful and
unreasonable searches and seizures and the right of people
to be secure in their papers and effects therefrom."
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the decision of
the lower court was affirmed. Mr. justice Holmes delivered the
opinion of the Court, and said inter alia: 15
= 267 U. S. 586 (1924).
1283 Fed. 999 (S. D. N. Y. 1922) ; aff'd 264 U. S. 298 (1924).
1, Ibid. at lOO5.
is 264 U. S. 298, 305 (1924).
26 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
"The mere facts of carrying on a commerce not con-
fined within state lines and of being organized as a corpora-
tion do not make men's affairs public, as those of a railroad
company now may be. . . Anyone who respects the
spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth Amendment would
be loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize one
of its subordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions into
the fire, . . . and to direct fishing expeditions into
private papers on the possibility .that they may disclose evi-
dence of crime. We do not discuss the question whether it
could do so if it tried, as nothing short of the most explicit
language would induce us to attribute to Congress that in-
tent. The interruption of business, the possible revelation
of trade secrets, and the expense that compliance with the
Commission's wholesale demand would cause are the least
considerations. It is contrary to the first principles of jus-
tice to'allow a search through all the respondents' records,
relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn
Up.)
The federal courts intimated, and it undoubtedly is so, that
states granting charters to corporations would have power to
exact reports as a reserved power in granting such charters. Dr.
Ripley wisely concludes, however, that attempted state regula-
tion of the matter would be futile as a practical remedy, because
of diversified conditions and because of the inability of state
laws to operate extraterritorially.
The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia also entered
a decree enjoining the Commission from collecting penalties in a
similar situation in Claire Furnace Company et al. v. Federal
Trade Commission.1" Here the Commissioh demanded not only
reports and statistics but also income statements and balance
sheets, in pursuance of a request of a congressional committee
which was investigating prevailing high prices in certain basic
commodities. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States, and was argued twice before that Court. The
argument of the Government rested largely on the ground that
the demand of the Commission was not an unreasonable invasion
of privacy, and that the information sought was an appropriate
is285 Fed. 936 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1923).
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means of regulating interstate commerce. The defense relied
mainly on the fact that the demand for the reports was an un-
reasonable invasion of privacy and therefore contrary to the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
It was also argued that the information sought was not an appro-
priate means of regulating interstate commerce, inasmuch as the
intrastate activities of the companies called on for reports were
so interwoven with their interstate business that it was impossible
to separate them; and even if separated, such separation would
result in inaccurate and valueless information.
In addition to this, the defendants objected that the infor-
mation could not be called for except for use in pending legal
proceedings involving specific charges of unfair competition or
violation of the anti-trust acts, or for immediate use in connec-
tion with some concrete proposal for legislation pending in Con-
gress.
Further, the Court was reminded of the fact that the reports
called for would disclose costs and profits which, in general prac-
tice, are jealously guarded secrets of every manufacturer, be-
cause a disclosure of these to competitors is, and always has
been, detrimental to management of manufacturing companies in
price quoting. Losses due to this, it would seem, might out-
weigh advantages to the very stockholders whom Dr. Ripley, by
his publicity plan, would hope to benefit.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not meet or decide
the issue in its decision, and dismissed the bill for want of equity.
The Court found that the bill in equity, to enjoin the Commis-
sion from attempting to enforce its orders, was improper pro-
cedure, in view of the express terms of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, which provides (Section io) that failure to file
reports demanded by the Commission carries a money forfeit,
payable by civil suit brought in the name of the Government,
through the Attorney General of the United States.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds is most
significant when he said that "the Commission went beyond any
power granted by Congress" in demanding the reports. It is not
unreasonable to assume that that might well reflect the opinion
of the Court if it had then decided these cases on their merits.
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In conclusion, it may be said that practices complained of
present an evil for which there may be no remedy, at least in so
far as federal aid or regulation is concerned, and in particular
any attempted effort to effect relief through the medium of the
Federal Trade Commission. It would involve a great stretch of
imagination to take any decided case as authority for demand-
ing the reports called for by Dr. Ripley through the Federal
Trade Commission, where the purpose is not, in any way, con-
nected with the regulation of interstate commerce, but is to sup-
ply financial data to stockholders and investors. This is as far
removed from the category of the regulation of interstate com-
merce as it is possible to conceive. The Trade Commission it-
self has recognized this in its recent request to the Attorney
General to discontinue action in the Republic Iron and Steel,
Bethlehem Steel, and in other cases where the Trade Commis-
sion was seeking similar reports.
A reference to Judge Sawyer's opinion In re Pacific Rail-
way CommissionY' seems peculiarly applicable to this proposal,
in which the Court said:
"A general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial, compul-.
sory investigation, conducted by a commission without any
allegations, upon no fixed principles, and governed by no
rules of law, or of evidence, and no restrictions except its
own will, or caprice, is unknown to our constitution and
laws; and such an inquisition would be destructive of the
rights of the citizen, and an intolerable tyranny. Let the
power once be established, and there is no knowing where
the practice under it would end."
IT32 Fed. 241, 263 (N. D. Calif. 1887).
